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ENHANCING RESILIENCE  
OF LONDON BY LEARNING FROM EXPERIENCES 
 
ABSTRACT 
 
The concept of resilience was introduced at the 
beginning of the 70s to indicate the capability of 
natural systems to absorb perturbations, preserving 
their structure and keeping the system functioning. 
The paper considers London as an example to a 
resilient city by focusing on some remarkable 
disasters in the history of London, such as the Great 
Fire in 1666, the Air Raids during the World War 2, 
18 December 1987 King’s Cross Fire, Terrorist Attack 
to the London Tube network on July 7, 2005, 
flooding in 1928 and 1953 Storm Surge. The paper 
starts by giving short descriptions of these disasters 
and continues by discussing the lessons learned. In 
this paper, the concept of resilience has been 
studied in three phases: prepare for, respond to and 
recover from a disaster. Besides, actions that have 
to be taken according to these three phases are 
going to be explored in detail. In conclusion, the 
notable effects of the mentioned disasters on 
structural and non-structural mitigation tools are 
revealed by considering resilience of London.   
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London, which is one of the biggest cities in the world since the 19th century, has proved being resilient to 
natural and man-made disasters several times. Since London was settled in A.D. 50, the city had 
experienced many disasters (Withington 2010, 3), some of which destroyed almost the entire city and some 
other gave partial damage. Wars, invasions, terrorism, fires, floods, epidemics, wild weather, fog, accidents 
such as train crashes or explosions and also financial disasters occurred in the history of London. Following 
each disaster, London recovered and evolved according to the needs of its inhabitants and adapted to the 
changing environment.  
In this paper, some of the notable disasters, which shape today’s London’s structural and non-structural 
mitigation measures to disasters, such as emergency management system, have been analysed by 
considering the lessons learned and their effects on the present system. The focus is on the Great Fire of 
1666, the air raids during the World War 2, 18 December 1987 Kings Cross Fire, the terrorist attack to tube 
network on the 7th of July 2005, 1928 flooding and 1953 storm surge. The first two examples, the Great Fire 
1666 and the blitz during World War 2 provided the opportunity to shape the London’s physical structure 
again. On the other hand, Kings Cross Fire and July 2005 terrorist attacks revealed the strategic, operational 
and systemic problems encountered during a disaster on the transportation system. Moreover, 6 January 
1928 flooding and 1953 East Coast Surge floods are chosen as they had noteworthy effects on the structural 
and non-structural defences to flooding in London. Campanella (2006, 143) states that a city is as resilient 
as its citizens, so it can be said that the common characteristic of all these examples is that each time both 
London and the citizens of London had proved their significant resilience.  
1  1666 GREAT FIRE 
In 1666, London was the biggest city in the UK with its estimated 500.000 population. Great fire of London 
lasted 5 days and destroyed more than 436 acres of urban land. Moreover, one in every three houses was 
destroyed by fire and around 70.000 people became homeless, which was the 14% of total population 
(Withington 2010, 71). The great fire of London led to improve fire regulations and “rebuilding of London Act 
1666” had been issued. The 1666 act regulated the rebuilding and authorised to widen the roads, the types 
and organization of buildings by locating a Fire Court. Act helped to organise the density of buildings 
according to the width of the streets. According to the Act, all buildings must be in brick or stone. The act 
also grouped the buildings that are permitted in four categories: 
− on the smaller streets: cellar, two floors high with an attic on by-lanes; 
− on larger streets: one more storey than the first category;  
− on main roads: two more storeys than the first category. 
Mansions with fewer restrictions than the other three but still restricted to four storeys plus cellar and attic.1 
Sir Christopher Wren prepared the new plan of London according to the act. In the new plan, central streets 
provide connections between main locations, while narrower streets divide residual areas in grid shape.2 
Organizing widths and orientation of the streets according to the facilities and density of the buildings had 
ensured effective mobility in the city. Moreover, dividing the city into four districts in accordance to the fire 
regulations was an attempt that improved resilience of the city in case of a fire incident. In each district, 
there were «800 buckets and 50 ladders, as well as shovels, pick axes and hand-held squirts». People also 
were informed about the fire-fighting equipment and how to quell a chimney fire etc. (Withington 2010, 75). 
Moreover, fire insurance concept aroused, as many businesspeople bankrupted due to the fire. First 
                                                                  
1 http://london.allinfo-about.com/features/rebuilding.html (Stephen Inwood, A History of London) (30.04.2012). 
2 RIBA Library Drawings and Archives Collections, http://www.architecture.com/LibraryDrawingsAndPhotographs/Online 
Workshops/UrbanAdventures/01Wren.aspx (30.04.2012). 
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insurances were offered in 1680, by promising clients «the services of watermen as fire-fighters, or the 
rebuilding of their premises if these efforts failed to serve them», which is the way of emerging professional 
fire fighting in London (Withington 2010, 75-76).  
The Great Fire of London is a significant disaster in London’s history, because a much safer city was 
achieved by rebuilding according to the new rules defined by the “rebuilding of London act 1666” after the 
incident, which destroyed almost the entire city, and additionally, this disaster led to start professional fire 
fighting in London (Withington 2010, 76). 
2  THE WORLD WAR 2 AND AIR RAIDS 
In the Second World War, the causalities of air raids were more serious than the First World War. In the 
Second World War, in 1940, the transportation system was the main target and especially road network, the 
docks and railroads were bombed with an air raid. As fire engines were short in supply, different modes of 
transportation, such as taxis and private cars were used to carry mobile fire pumps to extinguish the fire 
(Withington 2010, 27). Furthermore, people were out of water, gas, electricity, food and basic services, even 
if their home stands. Moreover, sewage breached and contaminated water. Buses were used to evacuate 
people to rest centres in safer places. However, in the confusion, some of these buses could not find their 
way and could not arrive at safer places and rest centres. Regarding the tube network, people, who got 
stuck in London, used nearly 80 tube stations as shelters (Withington 2010, 27). Even though tube stations 
could seen as the best shelter place, they were actually hit by the bombs and hundreds of people died there. 
In the first six weeks of the air raids, more than 6.000 people were killed and 10.000 injured. 16.000 houses 
destroyed, 60.000 seriously damaged and 300.000 people needed re-housing (Withington 2010, 28). 
The London blitz provided the reason to plan and reconstruct the city again, as it happened after the Great 
fire. Patrick Abercrombie prepared “the county of London plan in 1943”, which states the deficiencies of 
London, such as «traffic congestion, depressed housing, inadequacy and maldistribution of open spaces» 
(Forshaw and Abercrombie 1943, 3) and provides ideas and plans for the development of the city. Due to 
the obsolete housing stock and declined quality of urban life, large numbers of Londoners migrated to the 
suburbs after the war. In the 40s, according to Abercrombie, London was just like a collection of villages and 
they need to be connected by new arterial and sub-arterial highways hierarchically. To solve the housing and 
traffic congestion problems, recover the population sprawl and define the edges of London (Hall 1989, 36), 
Patrick Abercrombie's plan for London's development was prepared between 1942 and 1944. The intention 
of this plan was to surround London with a green belt and regroup the population in the new or enlarged 
towns offering also workplaces (Parker 1999; Hall 1989; 1993). According to Hall (1989, 44), Abercrombie’s 
plan was an interpretation of Howard’s garden cities but in a bigger scale. By implementing the 
Abercrombie's plan, the population moved beyond the green belt successfully and the physical sprawl of the 
city stopped.  
3  18 NOVEMBER 1987 KING’S CROSS FIRE 
The fire at the King’s Cross was initially a minor accident which turned into a disaster. It could have had 
different results, if the employees had known how to distinguish a fire, and how to evacuate people. A small 
fire has noticed under one of the escalators by one of the staff. However, staff did not know the evacuation 
procedure, he could not handle the situation, so they called first the Police, and when the Police arrived at 
the station and saw the situation, they decided to call the fire brigade. Additional time has been lost due to 
communication problems, as the radio did not work in the underground. When Police decided to evacuate 
the station, they were sending customers up by escalators, where the fire is, because they thought that it 
F. Atun – Enhancing Resilience of London by Learning from Experiences 
 
 
 
 
 
150 - TeMA Journal of Land Use Mobility and Environment 2 (2012) 
 
was the only way to go out. When the fire brigades arrived, together with the staff and Police, they stopped 
the people coming up from the escalators, put them back onto the trains, and did not let the following trains 
stop at the platforms. Just three minutes after the fire brigades arrived at the station, a huge explosion 
occurred at the station (Withington 2010, 100-103). 
This chain of events indicates some vital points. First of all, un-trained underground staff was a shortcoming 
in this event, as only four of the staff on twenty-three staff on duty received training in evacuation/fire drills 
(Withington 2010, 104-106). Even though there were fire-fighting equipment all over the station, the staff 
was not able to use them. Secondly, communication was one of the main problems as radio did not work in 
the underground and the only way to communicate was landline or word of mouth. The supervisor of the 
station was in his room that was far from the fire and the only way to communicate with him was his 
internal phone, and he was informed about the fire twelve minutes after its first discovery. Although, fire 
brigades and British Police officers had radios, they were working only on the surface level (Withington 
2010, 104-106). 
In this accident, more than 200 fire brigades were involved, 31 people died and more than 50 people were 
injured. Although, there had been about 400 fires in the London underground between 1956 and 1987 
(Withington 2010, 98), the obligation of doing drills was introduced after this terrific fire at the King’s Cross 
tube station to make sure people knew what to do in times of emergency3. 
4  TERRORIST ATTACK TO THE TUBE NETWORK ON 7 JULY 2005 
In 2005, the terrorist bombs hitting the tube indicated what worked effectively and revealed the defects to 
be improved for better performance. When the bomb exploded at 8:51am, it took time for the officers to 
understand what had happened. The first thing that was seen was a massive loss of electrical power on the 
northern side of the Circle line. Two years before this event, there was power lost on the underground and a 
dramatic incident occurred as a result on the 23rd of August 2003 when many people were trapped in the 
tunnels and trains. Due to this accident anytime a new problem occurred, people tended to perceive that 
problem, similar to the one they experienced before. Therefore, as the reports were saying that there was 
no electrical power, the initial assumption of the authorities was that one of the electric providers blew 
causing all this noise. Within about ten minutes, further reports showed that the situation was more serious 
and different from the first assumption. By 9:15 am, it was decided to evacuate the tube network and the 
code amber4 was ordered to re-ensure employees, public and further trains from any risk. 
The employees were out of the network between 8:51 and 9:15, as there was a drivers’ stop next to the 
scene. Many people went to help the people stuck on trains and charged right into the tunnels where the 
bomb exploded. It took the emergency services a while to arrive at the scene. The employees of the 
underground went to those tunnels immediately and used what they had learned in previous training to do 
what they could.  
Some important lessons were learned from these incidents that need to be pointed out. First, management 
cannot intervene fast enough, as it takes too long to understand what is happening. Therefore, the most 
important thing is to train people ready to respond, as they are the most valuable resource and immediate 
response. Therefore, it is crucial to train people and make sure that they know what to do. Just two weeks 
before the terrorist attack, the London Underground had run a drill at Tower of Hill station. As they had 
trained, people did response very well. Additionally, they run table-top exercises with the emergency service 
                                                                  
3 The information gathered by conducting an interview with the former boss of London Underground, July 2011. 
4 Code amber is the code to evacuate network and control under circumstances. 
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a couple of times a year. All these exercises paid off, because employees of the London Underground were 
already in the incident scene and they were the first responders. 
There was one thing about the reaction of people at the bombsites. When the code amber was ordered, 
which was to evacuate the network by taking each train into a platform and getting people out, it was 
happening in the middle of the morning peak and there were people on trains all over the network. Thus, 
customers did not know what is going on. Trains were stopped, and people were made to get out of 
stations. They might never have been in that station before and those people were out on the street. 
250.000 people were in the network in that time, and hundreds and thousands of people evacuated within 
an hour.  
Communication in the underground system has improved after the terrorist attack. Before that, there was no 
inner operability and the existing communication system had failed in previous accidents. After this event, 
efficient means of communication were put in place. Today, there is a radio system, by which one can talk to 
anyone else both in the tunnels and the various underground levels. Moreover, the emergency services have 
channels on this radio system and they can talk to their own people.  
Another lesson learned regards the shortcoming of exaggerated focus of protocols. According to the 
previous arrangements, once an accident occurs, the Metropolitan police get the “gold control.” The London 
underground is under their authority. The Metropolitan police are responsible also for communicating with 
the public. Informing people was not the responsibility of the underground authority. However, the 
Underground Authority realized that it was a mistake, as their employees were looking for information about 
the incident. The Underground Authority thought that not giving the information to their employees would 
create distrust in the network. So, the Underground Authority shared the available information with their 
employee, thinking that otherwise employee would think authorities hide some information while their life 
are at stake. After the attack, to keep the trust of their employees, the London Underground Authority 
changed this protocol and decided that in case of accident, no information will be withhold to the employees 
and tell everything that they know and not know, taking the risk that the information might become public.  
Another limitation was that, there were no storage of medical supplies in the underground to deal with the 
situation and it took long for the emergency services to bring it there. One of the changes applied after the 
attack was putting more storage of medical supplies across the underground system, and very large supplies 
at strategic locations in the zone one, where it is most likely that an emergency may happen.  
One other lesson that is learned from this experience was the importance of drills for multiple incidents at 
the same time. The London underground used to do drills, but both the strategic planning and the 
emergency planning of drill scenarios were always about dealing with a single incident. A drill was never 
planned for multiple incidents at the same time. London Underground personnel could deal with an incident 
but dealing with three of them at the same time was quite challenging, especially when their knowledge was 
deficient. As a result, having multiple attacks changed the scenario planning for future training. 
At the incident scene, the employees of underground were grouped in three and the tasks had divided in 
these teams. The first team continued focusing on getting relief and dealing with the immediate incident. 
Another team was put together to deal with the planning and create new service patterns, like shuttle 
systems on both sides. Besides, there was a third team to focus on the immediate restoration of services at 
the bomb side, which was heavily engineering based. In this respect, the tunnels were inspected and blown 
up trains extracted. The primary aim was to bring the system back and organize the services again to 
continue functioning. The underground system started operating the next day in the morning.  
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A customer service program to informing people about any situation had been started before the terrorist 
attack and was accelerated after the incident. Now, drivers are talking on the P.A. constantly to inform 
public about any problem. For example, when there is a delay, drivers inform about the reason of delay.  
5  6 JANUARY 1928 FLOODING 
1928 flooding along the Thames and its branches was a combination of melting snow, deep depression, 
heavy rain and spring tide (Holford 1976, 97). The 6th of January, the height of the water at the Southend 
was 1.5 meters more than forecasted, and in the central London, 1.8 meters higher than predicted and 0.3 
meters more than formerly recorded level. The areas flooded were Battersea, Poplar, Greenwich, 
embankments at Temple station, Old Palace Yard, Westminster, Tate Gallery, Lots Power station, 
Wandsworth Gas Works, Blackwall Tunnel (Holford 1976, 97-98). Flooding made homeless more than 4000 
people (Holford 1976, 99). This event showed the insufficiency of the walls along the Thames and their 
height has risen after the event. Increasing the height of the walls cannot be an efficient and effective 
solution, and it cannot be done constantly. Should the wall be raised, this has to be done along the entire 
length of the wall. This operation is getting more costly and less efficient each time, because it involves also 
alteration of wharves, approaching roads and sometimes demolishing properties (Holford 1976, 100). 
The 1928 flooding led to improvements in the forecasting and warning systems for flooding. In terms of 
forecasting, a research program was started by the Meteorological Office and the Liverpool Observatory and 
Tidal Institute for studying storm surges. Regarding to alerts, a warning system for London was installed by 
using the danger level at Southend as a threshold. Lastly, the idea of building a barrier on the Thames River 
had discussed again after a similar storm in 1897 (Holford 1976, 100). 
6  EAST COAST SURGE FLOODS, 1 FEBRUARY 1953 
East Coast Surge flood is called also as North Sea Storm Surge and affected not only in England but also in 
the Netherlands and Belgium. The effects of this storm surge was more serious in the Netherlands than in 
the other two countries. The economic damage (1953 values) of this event was 1.5 billion guilders in the 
Netherlands and 50 million pounds in the UK (Jonkman and Kelman 2005, 2). Moreover, in the Netherlands 
200.000 hectares area inundated, in the UK 40.000 hectares and in Belgium 10.000 hectares (Jonkman and 
Kelman 2005, 2). Because of this incident, nowadays, the Netherlands has the most effective and efficient 
structural and non-structural mechanisms for flooding in Europe.  
The causalities in the UK mainly depended on being not able to forecast the event. The event occurred 
unexpectedly and without warning. Fatalities were higher in the sea towns in Canvey Island, Jaywick and 
Lynn where the buildings were of low quality, as, people started living in those kind of temporary and low 
quality buildings shortly after the war (Jonkman and Kelman 2005, 6). Main causalities were among elderly 
people. At Canvey Island 42 out of 58, at Jaywick 28 out of 34, and at Lynn all 14 fatalities were older than 
60 (Jonkman and Kelman 2005, 5-6). 
Met Office indicated that the surge expanded from Tilbury to Docklands and caused damages on Docks, oil 
refineries, factories, cement works, gas works and electricity generating stations. Additionally, 100 metres 
sea walls were destroyed, and, more than 1000 houses were flooded5.  
The shortcomings the forecasting and warning systems in the UK became evident during this disaster. 
People were unaware of their own vulnerability to storm surges and being without electricity and 
communication systems increased the number of causalities. Sea defences collapsed, and this situation led 
                                                                  
5 Met Office: Great weather events: the UK east coast floods of 1953, http://www.metlink.org/pdf/teachers/1953_east_ 
coast_floods.pdf. 
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to question the maintenance degree of the structural defences and their reliability (Jonkman and Kelman 
2005, 8-9). 
7  LESSONS LEARNED 
EVENT DESCRIPTION DEFICIENCIES SHORTCOMINGS 
EFFECTS ON 
STRUCTURAL PATTERN 
EFFECTS ON NON-
STRUCTURAL 
PATTERN 
1666 
Great Fire 
Lasted 5 days and 436 
acres burned. 70.000 
people became 
homeless (14% of 
London’s total 
population). 
Timber houses, narrow 
streets, not having 
sufficient equipment to 
extinguish fire. 
A grid plan prepared for 
rebuilding the city of 
London. “Rebuilding of 
London Act” issued, and all 
the buildings rebuild by brick 
or stone. Moreover, the act 
grouped the buildings in four 
categories and height of the 
buildings had arranged 
according to the width of the 
street. 
Fire regulations had 
improved, and the event 
led to initiate 
professional fire fighting. 
The rebuilding act divide 
the city into four districts 
and sufficient fire 
fighting equipment had 
provided for each 
district. People had 
informed about how to 
use the equipment to 
extinguish fire.
Air Raids 
during the 
World War 
2 
More than 6.000 
people were killed, 
10.000 people injured, 
16.000 houses 
damaged, 60.000 
houses seriously 
damaged, 300.000 
people needed re-
housing. 
Fire engines were short 
in supply. 
Evacuation of people 
was not successful.  
Shelters were in 
shortage.  
 
The plan of Abercrombie 
was prepared to reconstruct 
the city again. 
Docks were never fully 
repaired after the blitz and 
they were the regeneration 
areas during 80s. 
 
1987 
King’s 
Cross Fire 
31 people died, 50 
people were injured, 
200 fire brigades had 
been involved. 
Not having trained 
underground staff and 
communication problem. 
Timber escalators were 
removed. 
Doing drills has become 
obligatory for the 
employees of the Tfl. 
2005 
Terrorist 
Attack to 
the Tube 
Network 
Multiple attacks on the 
tube network. 
It took time to 
understand the real 
issue, as communication 
was a problem. 
Being disciplined about 
following the protocol. 
Not having medical 
supplies in the 
underground. 
Employees knew what to 
do, because they were 
doing drills twice a year, 
however they never 
practiced a drill for 
multiple accidents. 
Stores of medical supplies 
were put across the system 
and very large supplies at 
the strategic locations in the 
zone one.  
Inner operable radio system 
had built, know it is possible 
to talk to anyone no matter 
in the tunnel or not. 
To keep the trust with 
their employees, 
underground has 
changed their protocol 
and decided to 
communicate their 
employees and tell 
everything they know 
and do not know.  
Having multiple attacks 
changed the scenario 
planning for drills. 
January 
1928, 
Flood 
The water was 1.8 
meters higher than 
predicted in the 
central London and 
0.3 meters more than 
formerly recorded 
level. 
Not having a proper 
forecasting and warning 
system.  
Not having sufficient 
structural tools to 
prevent flooding. 
The height of the walls 
along the Thames had risen. 
Improvements on the 
forecasting and warning 
system: a research 
program for forecasting 
was started, and a 
warning system for 
London was established.  
East Coast 
Surge 
Flood 
1953 
More than 420 people 
died, 32.000 people 
were affected, and 
economic damage was 
50.000 million pounds 
(1953 values). 
The forecasting and 
warning systems were 
the shortcomings of this 
event. The maintenance 
degree and reliability of 
structural defences were 
other problems.
Thames Barrier had been 
built. 
Structural defences had 
been improved. 
Flood forecasting, 
monitoring and warning 
systems have been 
improved.  
Emergency management 
system has come to 
today’s level. 
Tab.1  Retrospective view of risk 
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After the Great Fire, a plan was prepared to rebuild the city by considering mitigation of fire risk first time in 
London’s history. Moreover, after the WW2, a plan had been prepared by the team of Sir Patrick 
Abercrombie to rebuild the city and to improve the existing deficiencies lasted since the beginning of the 19th 
century. This plan has given London its current shape. In addition, the Docks, which were severely damaged 
during the blitz, was subject to regeneration and economic revival in the 80s, and today the area consists of 
residential and financial activities.  
Furthermore, the fire at the King’s Cross underground station revealed the deficiencies of communication 
and un-trained underground staff in case of an emergency. After this event, getting involved in drills has 
become obligatory for the underground staff. However, communication system had not improved until the 
terrorist attack in 2005. Terrorist attacks on the 7th of July 2005, revealed the strategic, operational and 
systemic problems encountered during a disaster on the transportation system. Foremost problem in this 
example was communication between the staff in the tunnels and the people who were outside and trying to 
understand the real issue. As, employees of Tfl were doing drills since the King’s Cross fire, they knew what 
to do in case of an emergency, and this was one of the biggest advantages in this event. After the incident, 
a radio system has been installed and communication is not a problem anymore.  
Regarding to flooding, after the flood event in 1928 the focus was on the deficiency of structural mitigation 
tools. Besides, attention was given also to building forecasting and warning systems by conducting a 
research program for forecasting and by establishing a warning system for London. However, in 1953, a 
surge flood hit the southern part of the country including London, and this event showed that the 
forecasting and warning systems, which were established more than two decades ago, were not successful. 
After the event, having a barrier on the Thames had been considered again, and the construction of the 
barrier started in the 70s forecasting and warning systems have been improved and reached to today’s level. 
Table 1 indicates that each incident helped to improve structural and/or non-structural risk mitigation and/or 
management tools in the aftermath of the event. It also proved that seeing deficiencies of a system was not 
enough to improve it, sufficient resources must be provided as well. For example, the consequences of not 
having a proper communication system during an incident were seen in the King’s Cross Fire. However, the 
communication system has improved only after the terrorist attack in 2005, 18 years after the King’s Cross 
Fire. There is the similar situation for the construction of the Thames barrier. Since the 19th century, the 
need of having a barrier on the Thames was known, however the construction started only in the 70s.  
8  ENHANCING RESILIENCE OF LONDON 
The concept of resilience was introduced at the beginning of the 70s to indicate the capability of natural 
systems to absorb perturbations, preserve their structure and keep the system functioning. The 
characteristics of a person or group in terms of their capacity to anticipate, cope with, resist and recover 
from the impacts of natural hazard (Blakie et al. 2004). In ARMONIA project (2006; Walker at al. 2011, 17) 
‘resilience’ is defined as «the capacity of a system, community or society potentially exposed to hazards to 
adapt, by resisting or changing in order to restore or maintain an expectable level of functioning and 
structure». Godschalk (2005, 58) indicates «acting beforehand to mitigate the impact of a natural hazard is 
far more effective than picking up the pieces afterwards». Godschalk suggests investing in mitigation before 
the next disaster (2005, 58), however, in some of the examples in the case of London, such as Great Fire or 
King’s Cross Fire the strategy was to invest in mitigation after the last but before the next disaster.  
Furthermore, in this paper enhancing resilience capacities of a community in general can be considered in 
three phases. These phases are: “prepare for a disaster”, “respond to a disaster” and “recovery and 
reconstruction after a disaster” (Table 2). 
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PREPARE FOR A DISASTER RESPOND TO A DISASTER RECOVERY AND 
RECONSTRUCTION 
AFTER A DISASTER MITIGATION MEASURES EARLY WARNING 
DURING 
EMERGENCY 
Limiting 
exposure 
to hazard 
Restricting 
development within 
hazard zone 
 
Forecasting flood Defining first respondents 
and training them 
Physical  
Assessment of loss and 
damages 
Selecting development 
areas outside the 
hazard zone 
 
Monitoring flood An integrated system Repairing and 
reconstructing the built 
environment 
Land acquisition Disseminating warning 
to public by translation 
of scientific information 
coming from 
forecasting & 
monitoring  
Emergency drills with 
large public involvement 
Availability of partial 
relocation programs 
during reconstruction for 
the most critical situations 
Land use ordinances Training public on how 
to respond to warnings 
and how to act during 
emergencies  
Maintaining and 
mobilizing stand by 
people, materials and 
financial resources 
Building codes and 
retrofitting for new 
construction 
Density restrictions Establishing a 
community network 
Continuing long-term 
training of both 
emergency personnel and 
also public 
Availability to incorporate 
recovery/resilience 
measures in future urban 
redevelopment plans 
Community relocation Defining responsibilities 
and capabilities of 
institutions clearly 
 Sharing reconstruction 
plans among stakeholders 
Having disaster 
management plans 
Warning industries, 
plants and hazardous 
facilities 
 Existence of skilled 
workers for reconstruction 
activities 
Geographical and 
economic importance of 
potentially affected 
settlements 
Dimi-
nishing 
direct and 
indirect 
impacts of 
hazard 
Sea walls Evacuation of public 
 Infra-
structure 
Mapping damage 
Leaves Mobilizing material and 
emergency personnel 
Quick survey on damaged 
parts 
Dams   Using spare materials for 
repair 
Fire breaks 
 
Availability of personnel 
for repair work 
Quarantine  
Existence of protocols to 
proceed with repairs 
requiring interlifelines 
intervention 
 
Strongly built 
environment to resists 
physical forces of 
hazards 
Sharing the 
losses 
Insurances  
  Eco-nomic  
Insurance coverage 
Relief funds  
Dependence of economic 
actors on loss of 
environmental perils  
Personal savings  Access to funds 
 
Restoring pre-disaster 
situation, financial and 
medical services 
Degree of diversification 
and capacity to spread 
risk 
 
Facilitating permanent 
return of residents 
Providing work for those 
who lost their work 
    Social  
Healing injured and 
traumatized community 
Bringing together 
separated families 
Identifying dead 
    Institu-tions 
Liability  
Transparency in funds 
Ability to learn from past 
events 
Tab. 2 Enhancing resilience capacity of communities for flood hazard risk in London 
 
First phase, “prepare for a disaster” includes mitigation measures, such as limiting the exposure to hazard 
and diminishing direct, indirect impacts of hazard and sharing the losses. First, as for limiting the exposure 
to hazard, the development within hazard zone has to be restricted, and new development areas must be 
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selected outside the hazard zone. Moreover, land acquisition, land use ordinances, density restriction, 
community relocation and having disaster management plans are the other measures to limit the exposure 
in the hazard zone. Second, to mitigate the risk of hazard both direct and indirect impacts of a possible 
hazard have to be diminished by developing strongly built environment to resist physical forces of hazard 
and by building sea walls, leaves, fire breaks, quarantine, dams or barriers as in the London case. The third 
issue as for mitigating measures is sharing the losses by insurances, relief funds, personal savings, financial 
and medical services and indeed facilitating permanent return of residents who left the city shortly after 
occurrence a disaster. 
Moreover, in the respond phase to a disaster there are early warning and emergency management aspects. 
The success of early warning depends on the success of the procedures coming before disseminating the 
early warning, such as forecasting and monitoring hazard. Monitoring hazard is a continuous activity to 
forecast possible hazards and understand its severity and duration. The quality of monitoring and forecasting 
could help to increase the warning lead-time. Therefore, people can be warned and informed about the 
existing risk to take the essential precautions before the occurrence of a hazard. While disseminating 
warning, the language of warning has to be transformed from scientific language which consists technical 
terms to the one that can be understood clearly by public. 
Recovery after a disaster can be studied by considering the city in physical, infrastructural, economic, social 
and institutional systems. To recover the physical structure, first loss and damages have to be assessed 
before starting and reconstructing the built environment. In some cases, assessment and repairing works 
are done simultaneously to start operating the system as soon as possible. This can be possible in small and 
close systems, as it has seen in the example of terrorist attack to the London tube network in June 2005. 
However, it cannot be feasible in large-scale disasters. Before repairing also new building codes for new 
construction of the built environment has issued by the authorities.  
If the previously mentioned disasters are considered within the structure of Table 2, the Great Fire in 1666 
and reconstruction after air raids are good examples to increase resilience of a city by improving the physical 
conditions and taking precautions in the pre-disaster phase. In the latter example, after the World War 2, 
the physical deficiencies and unhealthy structure of the city healed by restricting density in the central 
London, controlling urban sprawl and traffic congestion and improving the quality of the physical 
environment. Furthermore, after the Great Fire, the city planned again by taking into account land-use 
ordinances, restricting the density and development, organizing height of the buildings according to the 
width of the streets and preparing disaster management plans in case of fire. Private insurance companies 
have established first time in the history to insure especially businesses in case of a fire incident. In addition, 
there are also two issues, which corresponded to the response phase of a disaster. First, public were trained 
on how to behave during a fire incident, how to extinguish fire and how to clean their chimneys. Second, in 
addition to improving fire regulations, professional fire brigade units were initiated with the name of 
watermen.  
Moreover, after the 1987 King’s Cross Fire, doing drills became obligatory for the entire underground staff 
and as it was seen in the 2005 Terrorist attacks, the underground personnel knew what to do and dealt with 
the situation very well as being the first respondents to the incident. However, communication has been 
improved after the 2005 terrorist attacks. 2005 Terrorist attacks also proved that the underground system is 
also resilient to such a multiple attack in terms of recovering after the incident. Regarding to the 
infrastructure, first, the damage has mapped by a quick survey on the damaged parts of the network. The 
resources and existing personnel were available for conducting repairing work, while some of the staff were 
still responding to the incident.  
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1928 flooding and 1953 Storm Surge event are the two examples which led to improve resilience by focusing 
on preparation and respond phases. As for the preparation, height of the see walls have increased, barriers 
such as Thames and Barking were constructed. For being able to respond to disaster, forecasting, 
monitoring and warning systems have been improved and warning networks have been established.  
To sum, in the London case the ability to learn from failures and improving the system according to lessons 
learnt definitely increase resilience of the system. In addition, in the course of the time structural and non-
structural mitigation have been improved reaching today’s advanced level. In general, on one hand, the city 
is becoming more resilient by improving the system in all three phases, on the other hand, the exposure was 
increasing and formerly floodplain areas were becoming the attraction point for development after the 
construction of the Thames Barrier. Today, the barriers and embankments have protected the area 
according to the 1 in 1000 year flood event. However, during the construction of these defences, climate 
change and sea level rise have not been considered. Although flood hazard probability is changing due to 
climate change and sea level rise, the main reason of increasing flood risk in London is the post-defence 
development (Parker 1995, 341) and increased ownership of goods and property in the floodplain (Parker et 
al. 1987; Green and Penning-Rowsell 1989, cited in Parker 1995, 342). The post-defence development after 
the construction of the Thames Barrier in the 80s, such as increasing number of population, buildings, 
companies and firms, and extended infrastructure in the floodplain, led to increase exposure to hazards. 
Moreover, more businesses have been established and more infrastructures have been constructed in the 
area. By developments in the area, investment on transportation has also increased to connect the area both 
to London (DLR-Docklands Light Rail) and to the rest of the world (City Airport). Although the area is well 
connected to London, because of lack of redundancy of rail and road networks, any disruption on the 
existing transportation system in the area could lead to isolate the area from the rest of the city. 
Furthermore, having any disruption on these infrastructures in case of an incident could create not only 
direct damages but also indirect damages have increased due to increasing number of businesses, 
infrastructure and demand on traffic in the area (Parker 1995, 342). Though the probability of risk is low, 
due to increasing exposure and investments in the area, the consequences of an incident would be very high 
and costly. 
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